Green Parties in National Governments by Ferdinand Müller-Rommel & Thomas Poguntke

Author:Ferdinand Müller-Rommel & Thomas Poguntke [Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand & Poguntke, Thomas]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: American Government, National, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781135288266
Google: ndz9AQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 20309335
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2002-05-01T00:00:00+00:00

Strategies within Government

In the coalition agreement, both parties had agreed to govern on the basis of consensus. In cabinet, no party would be outvoted ‘on issues which are of fundamental importance for one coalition partner’. Both parties would take responsibility ‘for the entire policy of the coalition’. In the case of conflict, the coalition agreement set out a specific procedure: The coalition partners will form a coalition committee. It will discuss matters of fundamental importance requiring co-ordination between the coalition partners and bring about a consensus in cases of conflict. It will consist of eight members from each coalition partner. It will convene at the request of either coalition partner.’

However, governmental practice was different. The 16-member ‘Coalition committee’ never met as envisaged by the coalition agreement. Although some Greens had pushed for a more formal arrangement, this had been opposed by the SPD, in particular parliamentary group leader Peter Struck who saw the committee only as a last resort in a political crisis. Instead, the main body which discussed coalition business is usually described as the Koalitionsrunde (‘coalition round’), a group of people who meet at irregular intervals and in varying compositions in line with the policy decisions to be taken. The Cabinet never appeared to be an arena for serious bargaining and discussion. As far as possible, the aim was to reach consensus well before in ‘coalition rounds’ and only to bring to cabinet meetings what already had been agreed upon.

Many key decisions were taken outside of this arena, within individual ministries, in negotiations between ministries or in personal consultation between ministers and the Chancellor. The Schroder style of consensus politics also involved the creation of many other bodies to take a policymaking role, such as the Alliance for Jobs, the energy consensus talks, and a whole range of commissions, for example, on the reform of the armed forces and on immigration. This effectively removed key decision-making processes from coalition politics and thus weakened the influence of the Greens. It also emphasised the power Schroder exercised in choosing the arenas in which policies were discussed, according to his preferences.

At the core of the coalition stood the relationship between Schroder and Fischer. Both knew each other long before the coalition. While Fischer was thought to be closer to Lafontaine, he appeared to get on well with Schroder from the start. Throughout what often was a stormy relationship between the parties, neither Schroder nor Fischer ever seriously criticised the other in public. Only on the question of opening the way for the export of German tanks to Turkey did news of a serious political rift between the Chancellor and his deputy reach the public domain.

At least at the beginning of the coalition, neither Schroder nor Fischer could, however, be said to be in control of their respective parties. Oskar Lafontaine was still party leader and claimed the right to have a major influence, with major conflicts within the SPD thus being predicted. Lafontaine’s abrupt departure on 11 March 1999 resolved that problem far sooner than had been anticipated.

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